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What hypertext and fictocriticism have in common is this: they decide upon a model of 
cognition or subjectivity and then use this model as the structure for organising what are 
variously described as textual fragments, nodes, units or lexia. They share an emphasis on 
non-linear systems, a re-figuring of the relationship between reader-writer and text, the 
significance of agency, and of the contingent quality of any reading, writing, and hence text 
Hypertext theorists and practitioners (especially the 'boosters') commonly use these terms to 
describe the structure of electronic writing space: 'navigation';  'exploration'; 'equality'; 
'freedom';  'collaboration'. Fictocriticism uses the following terms to describe the structure of 
its space: 'hybridity';  'negotiation';  'fragmentation'; 'self-consciousness'; 'bio-graphical';  
'non-hierarchical'. Both, I would suggest. are about simulating the activity of cognition (or 
subjectivity) by activating these terms in their respective models. Hypertext predominantly is 
about simulating cognition (or human intelligence) and in many ways this can be attributed to 
its technological inheritance, which also weds it to the search for models of artificial 
intelligence. It is also largely driven by American techno-capital and it seems to me that it is 
modelling a particularly American position of the ideal subject (hence the use of the terms 
above). As Ulmer puts it, the '"twin peaks" of American ideology-realism and 
individualism-are built into lbe computing machine' (1). Fictocriticism is largely drawing 
upon postmodem models of subjectivity, which maintain that the contemporary subject is a 
temporal configuration of textual fragments. Hence 'writing' the posbnodem text is a form of 
self composition, and the text (see Barthes) is read as an artefact of subjectivity which reads 
(and writes) subjectivity. 
Hypertext and fictocriticism both legitimate their textual structures by proposing that 
tbey offer methods or technologies for simulating an original, be it cognition or subjectivity. 
In other words, both technologies seem to have as their goal the reproduction and 
multiplication of simulated self-hood. Indeed they could be described as cloning technologies. 
And why? Possibly because the self as technological simulation fits well into the market of 
hyper-real commodity exchange. In other words, both hypertext and fictocriticism offer 
methods for constructing a saleable commodity: a self that is a 'non-hierarchical' 'hybrid' of 
'self-conscious' 'fragments', one that can 'explore' and 'negotiate' 'freely' in the information 
market. If in the near future pedagogy becomes the management of information then botb 
hypertext and fictocriticism are well placed to produce the managers of the future. 
Fictocriticism can be described as the way in which pedagogical methods have put into 
practice the theories of postmodemism. Fictocriticism is, technically speaking, not only a 
theory but also a methodology or slructure which involves doing the postmodem 'talk' and 
'walk'. Embraced by educational institutions as a pedagogical style, it indicates yet another re-
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working of the terms 'tbeory' and 'practice', this time with a view to a negotiated and 
contingent settlement between rbetorical and subject positions. There are a1so limits to this 
writing and they can be found in the logic of the discourse in which one is located. So 
fictocriticism is also a place of ambiguities in tenns of the 'margin' and 'centre', 'subject' and 
'object' of discourse. For example, a traditional thesis would locate divination within a larger 
analysis of cultural self-formation, whereas fictocriticism would read with divination, utilising 
it as a structure to stage an act of criticism. This is one reading of the notion of a 'criticism 
without an argument'. This also invites the notion that fictocriticism is possibly a kind of 
contamination or pollution of rational academic writing: 'matter out of place'. Fictocriticism 
may tberefc:re be an experiment with academic ecology: asking bow far writing/reading can go 
before it begins to contaminate and pollute the discursive regime in which it operates. 
Fictocriticism is also a method which engages with the distinction between literature and 
theory; self and Other; text and corporeal body; individual and community; work and play; and 
last but not least. flesh and electricity. The re-working of these terms in a practical sense 
within the academy seems to be a historical inevitability. This has important implications for 
the future of that institution, its workers, and its relation to the broader community. 
Central to current theorising of the fictocritical is Bartbes' A Lover's Discourse. The 
introduction claims that tbe text is not a metalanguage of love but a perfonnance of a ;primary 
language' (3). Although be makes this claim, it must be it that the principle of organising the 
text is a kind of metalanguage, and it is the metalanguage about subjectivity and its relation to 
language. The particular subject is the lover, about whom Barthes makes a number of general 
statements in order to construct a model of that general subject. the lover. What is the lover? 
The lover is an assemblage of fragments of discourse because that's the way it is: 'the lover in 
fact. cannot keep his mind from racing, taking new measures and plotting against himself. His 
discourse exists only in outbursts of language, which occur at the whim of trivial, of aleatory 
circumstances' (3). Hence, because the 'original' lover is composed out of momentary 
outbursts that owe no allegiance to any overall thesis, so too is the texl organised along 
'arbitrary' and non-linear lines: 'the figures are non-syntagmatic, non-narrative' (7). Again: 
'the lover speaks in bundles of sentences but does not integrate these sentences on a higher 
level, into a work; his is a horizontal discourse: no transcendence, no deliverance, no novel' 
(7). Hence the fragments or figures 'cannot be classified: organised, bierarchized, arranged with 
a view to an end (a settlement)' (7). So the organising principle could be described as that of 
imitation, impersonation and simulation. 
Barthes makes certain claims about the way the original lover's subjectivity is structured, 
and then imitates this language structure in the structure of the lext. hence simulating the 
subjectivity of the lover. He models a certain subjectivity and then simulates it in a discursive 
performance. 
So the lover is the subject of the text, or the text is the subject/lover. If the text were an 
analysis of 'the lover', it could not take on those qualities of subjectivity which it desires. Or 
at least I think that is Barthes' position when he says: 'the description of the lover's discourse 
has been replaced by its simulation, and to that discourse has been restored its fundamental 
person, the I, in order to slage an utterance, nol an analysis' (3). An authentic staging seems 
to be the goal. Perhaps what we have here is a desire for naturalistic theatre: the most life-like 
re-creation of 'someone speaking wilhin bimselr (3). 1n irs drive towards naturalism it seems 
to be a strangely pre-modem kind of theatre. Strange because its notion of subjectivily is 
definilely postmodem. 
1be structure of the relationship between discursive fragments (non-linear, arbitrary, non­
hierarchical) the studied absence (or conditional presence) of a meta-theory, the text as subject 
('I'), the centrality of subjective utterance, are all important features of this text, and have been 
noted by a number of writers as components of the fictocritical, indeed as necessary 
components of it (see King). I would suggest, however, that these are necessary components 
when a general (posllllOdem) tbeay of subjectivity is extrapolated from the 'real' and used as a 
model for the textual simulation of subjectivity. If Barthes' text is used as an exemplar for 
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fictocriticism, such a ficiOCr:iticism will be bound to a naturalistic representation of the real or 
tbe original, even though this original, and the very legitimacy of the notion of the original, 
does not supposedly exist. In other words it will be resurrecting the notion of the original in 
its simulation of postmodem subjectivity. 
I want to pose some questions. How would, going on Barthes' model, 'An Academic's 
Discourse' be structured? Is there a general relationship between the subject and his or her 
discourse, and if so, can it be modelled? If it can be modelled, it may be possible to simulate 
the subjectivity of the academic. And here I think I am entering into the area of Artificial 
Intelligence. But isn't this already the 'reality' of academia? Isn't writing the process of 
following a model of subjectivity construction, so that the writer is in effect impersonating 
tbe original, or in fact actually the illusory presence of the original in the model? Or is it that 
the pedagogical process is actually a naturalistic thealre, where the nature of the pedonnance is 
largely detennined by the dominant theory of subjectivity? In other words, are we perhaps 
entering into a period (and the fictocritical is a part of this) where the academic/student is 
searching for ways to reproduce (simulate) your standard fragmented postmodem self? That is, 
the urge to write fictocritically within the academy is the urge to simulate the model of 
postmodem subjectivity, just as Barthes' text is driven by the urge to simulate his model of 
the lover. 
It seems to me that the fictocritical (however described) is a self-conscious collage of 
genre fragments, which posits subjectivity as being a presence and process of its textual 
landscape. Subjectivity in this sense is constituted in the activity of mapping a relationship 
between fragments, but likewise, the meaning of the landscape is in some way detennined by 
this subjective agency. In this description there is both a humanist notion of subjectivity and 
a postmodem one. 
What the fictocritical can do is to model the activity of aesthetic self formation. It gives 
examples of 'how to .. . ' .  In a sense it simulates this process. On the other hand, the 
fictocritical is also a representation of the process-an example of another's self formation. If 
tbe fictocritical is an assemblage, it is a dead assemblage--one that has been completed to be 
read off. In other words, the final fictocritical artefact denies the reader the kind of agency 
which it valorises. Although the fictocritical invites readers to take a Barthes-like pleasure in 
the text, it seems that it is really inviting them to witness someone else 's pleasure. How to 
deal with lhis? 
One suggestion is to utilise infonnation technology, and specifically Hypertext, where 
the reader is able to compose a multiplicity of relationships between fragments within lhe 
simulaled space of the computer. A computer-fictocritical space could be both a method (art) 
and an artefact of the process of constructing discourse and the process of self-formation. In 
this sense it functions as a postmodern pedagogy. 
Hypertext bas been described as a new stage in reading and writing, which incorporates 
much of print technology and re-configures it: it brings in the scroll, the icon; footnotes and 
glosses are not 'marginalised' but treated as 'equal players' in the hypertext field. Changes in 
the relationship between reader and writer are considered to be of utmost significance. The 
reader of hypertext can compose almost innumerable connections between topical units 
(fragments, nodes). The reader in this sense writes with the text, they 'perform the text', while 
the author is the one who supplies the topical units and possible connections (158). In 
Ulmer's terms the author constructs lhe paradigm within which the reader constructs a 
meaning (see below). The text that is read is therefore transitory, provisional, quasi-unique. 
1be reader is therefore also the author. In this sense the conventional difference between reader­
author-text begins to blur. It is the product of a combination of reader, text and author. Bolter 
suggests that the change in these relationships is brought about by the change in technology, 
but these changes have also been anticipated by authors working on and with print technology 
(Barthes, Derrida eiC.) (164). Bolter acknowledges the power of their predictions yet suggests 
that electronic writing (EW) moves beyond them. Their experiments with language 
construction are useful for EW, but are also constrained by the fact that they derive from 
100 Simon Robb 
critiques of the language of print technology. In other words, they cease to be useful as 
critiques of EW because they have been incorporated as methodologies or techniques in this 
new medium (166). The same perhaps could be said of fictocriticism. 
Here is Ulmer's version of an electronic 'criticism without the argument': 
the scholar does not provide a specific line of argument, an enunciation, but 
constructs the whole paradigm of possibilities, the set of statements, leaving the act 
of utterance, specific selections and combinations, to the reader/user. Or rather, the 
scholar's 'argument' exists at the level of the ideology/theory directing the system of 
the paradigm, derennining the boundaries of the inclusion/exclusion. (8) 
So perhaps bypenext is an electric fictocriticism which holds out the promise of constant 
self-composition. Or perhaps electric fictocriticism is a form of Artificial Intelligence? 'For 
artificial intelligence specialists lhe mind is nothing other than a self-activating text' (Bolter 
184). AI is generally modelled on the structure of cognition, but not. as far as I know, on the 
structure of human subjectivity. Perhaps it gets down to a difference between imitation and 
simulation, to a question of who activates the text. 
The merger of mind and machine, anticipated in science fiction and the Gothic tale, the 
goal of AI research, is also analogous to the merging of subjectivity with those critical 
technologies which are deployed to construct it, and lhe merging of analysis and its Other in 
the fictocritical. Indeed this merging is also one of horror, the apocalypse and the cyborg. 
Perhaps the elecbic fictocritical is a fonn of abject Artificial Intelligence? 
And while discussing electric subjectivity are we refening to a structure of language that 
is only set in circuits (as the text of computer technology is) or a dynamic structure that is 
also located inside flesh? The point I want to make is to ask whether artificial intelligence is 
tbe same as artificial subjectivity (AS), and what part the body plays in this difference. 
Academic writing, when figured as a performance, describes the action of 'building' a 
character through critical-aesthetic work. This process, according to Foucault, takes place in 
the presence, ;or virtual presence', of a subject who witnesses. judges, etc. in the manner of 
the confessional (61). If the hyper-textual or fictocritical field is an accurate simulation, it will 
need to allow for a relatively unconlrollable and 'arbitrary' judgement to occupy the space of 
self formation. Of course another side of this coin is sadism and masochism, where, in the 
competitive mark.et of ideas, attempts are made to kill off and inflict pain on an other written 
self. These are all rhetorical markers of the discourse in which academic writing operates, and 
as such, are necessary to any interactivity within a 'user unfriendly' electric fictocriticism. 
1bis implies that any performative act will need to negotiate and accommodate the electronic 
other to its methodology and constructed self. 1be end result is to open out academic self­
formation to 'incommensurate' practices. 
I would add that in academic performance, impersonation, imitation, and simulation are 
all meth.ods of self construction which are employed to measure the self against other written 
selves. Writing within tbe academy is in large part an imitation of those styles that have 
preceded it If the self can be constructed it can also be deconstructed, dispersed, deferred. The 
self without boundaries is really the non-self, and it is one that is always haunting academic 
writing, where error is analogous to death. 
So in academic writing tbere are some •tendencies' present which I would suuunarise as 
being a series of anxieties about death, power, and imitation. These anxieties have been 
traditionally addressed, or 'solved', by the deployment of originality, sequential logic, an 
appeal to universality, etc. and more recently by an actual admission or confession of critical 
anxiety (see King). Both the fictocritical and hypertext are examples of this move towards a 
structure of anxiety, as opposed to, perhaps, a discourse on anxiety. They are both 'gocx:l' 
posboodem citizens. Tbey both share an •accommodating' accommodation towards quotation, 
reconciliation, bybridisation, fragments, borrowed ideas, self-consciousness, ambiguities, 
performance, provisional form, plurality, prOOuctive dialogue. Tbey share a mutual disavowal 
of authorial authority, accumulative argument, objectivity, universal authority, humanist 
tradition, linear coherence, repression. So, in sales-speak, fictocriticism and hypertext are an 
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accoounodation and a celebration of a negotiation between genre fragments. 
Given what I have said already, I could characterise electric fictocriticism as a technology 
lhat, in promising transgression or liberation, soothes academic and market anxieties about 
death, power and imitation. Put another way, it is a way for academic writing to claim that it 
is still alive, powerful and original by embracing the signs of its own demise. And lhat' s all 
right according to Baudrillard who claims that tbe destiny of theory is to predict its own 
demise-and that is to become what it is not (98). The destiny of the postmodem pedagogue 
may likewise be predicted in the lechnology of artificial subjectivity. 
Wben lbeory becomes what it is not (and here we return 10 lhe lover's subjectivity, to the 
total simulation of cognition) lhe theorist also disappears, and lhis situation can only be 
averted wben the theorist re..configures what it is that theory is not. To 'have a life' a critical 
practice must also have a death, and this is the line that fictocriticism treads, just as the 
'concept of the author is never more alive than when it is pronounced dead' (Burke 7). 
Academic divination is not a mysticism, but the mirror of the logic of cause and effect. 
Figured as a performance practice it partially addresses the existence of non-linear time within 
the assemblage of the pedagogical 'scene'. 
University of Adelaitk 
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